



his article examines the Canadian
labour market during the 1990s and
contrasts it to prior decades, with a
special focus on distributional outcomes. It
discusses changes in relative earnings
between groups, changes in relative labour
market outcomes of women and older
workers, changes in earnings and income
inequality and changes in low income.
The labour market in the 1990s is
thought to have differed in many ways from
earlier decades. Such differences can influ-
ence income levels and distributions and
the relative earnings of various groups. For
example, the “new economy” spurred on by
the computer-technology revolution and
expanding international trade has created
new opportunities for many people, but
also may have left behind less-skilled work-
ers. New employment relationships have
become increasingly common, as reflected
in the growing number of self-employed
workers. The very rapid growth in the edu-
cational attainment of workers, particular-
ly among younger women and older
workers, has certainly influenced relative
earnings, and likely resulted in firms sig-
nificantly altering their production process-
es. This in turn influences the relative
wages of the less-skilled and highly skilled
workers through shifts in labour demand.
Changes in public institutions and transfer
programs have no doubt affected the
incomes of less well-off Canadians. Finally,
all these factors have occurred in the con-
text of slow macroeconomic growth, at least
for the first half of the decade.
This article asks two questions: How
has this environment affected the relative pay
of various workers and the distribution of
income among families? What groups of
workers have gained and lost as a result of
these changing patterns of work? Our pri-
mary objective is to present results on the
distribution of income in Canada, which we
hope will serve as a useful introduction to
this subject. This article is descriptive in
nature and draws on previously reported
findings from many different sources.
The article focuses on four topics: (1)
earnings and income inequality, (2) the rel-
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relative position of men and women, and
(4) changes in low income in Canada dur-
ing the 1990s.
Earnings inequality rose modestly for
men during the 1990s (compared to faster
increases in the 1980s) but changed little for
women. For workers as a whole there is little
evidence of rising earnings inequality, at least
to 1997. At the family level, however, earn-
ings inequality did rise, driven largely by
changes in family formation patterns.
Through the middle 1990s inequality in
family disposable income (after taxes and
transfers) remained stable, as it had in the
previous few decades in Canada. Generally
speaking, the tax/transfer system prevented
rising family earnings inequality from trans-
lating into rising family disposable income
inequality, although there is evidence that
family income inequality started to rise in
the later 1990s.
However, aggregate inequality trends
often mask significant changes in relative
wages. Even within the context of little
change in earnings inequality, there can be
significant movements in the relative wages
of various groups, movements that often off-
set one another when added together. During
the 1990s there was a continued decline in
real wages among young men overall, but
wages for young university-educated men
and women rose in the last years of the
decade. The position of women has contin-
ued to improve in terms of labour-market
outcomes and wages relative to that of men.
Low-income trends are significantly
influenced by the business cycle, generally
rising in periods of recession and falling in
periods of expansion. During the 1990s,
however, as weak expansion took hold
throughout the 1993-96 period, the low-
income rate did not fall as expected but con-
tinued to rise. The result was that during the
latter half of the 1990s in particular, both
the low-income rate (the share of the popu-
lation in low income) and the low-income
gap (the depth of low income) were higher
than they had been in comparable periods
during the 1980s, at least among the non-
elderly population.
WHY DID RELATIVE INCOMES
CHANGE IN THE 1990S?
Following are five broad factors which
help to explain why incomes and work
arrangements among Canadians may have
changed during the 1990s.
Changes in Trade and
Technology
Shifts in labour demand associated
with trade and technology are thought to
have resulted in considerable structural
change in the economy. At the core of this
change, workers with more skills or expe-
rience are thought to be in greater demand,
while other workers are left behind. All
other factors being equal, this would result
in increasing relative wages for the more
highly skilled. If the supply of highly
skilled workers rose alongside demand, the
wage impact of increased demand could be
offset by the increased supply. The shifts in
relative demand for the more or less high-
ly skilled could potentially affect either rel-
ative wages or employment levels. In a
country where wages are comparatively
rigid, the impact of technological change
may result in declining relative employ-
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changing relative wages. This is sometimes
called the “skill-biased technological
change hypothesis,” since technologies are




At the same time, many firms changed
the way they managed their workforces.
“Downsizing” and “contracting out” became
buzzwords of the 1990s. Self-employment,
which by its nature is a less stable form of
employment than traditional “paid” work,
grew substantially as a fraction of total
employment in Canada.
These new employment arrangements
may have affected labour-market perform-
ance. Betcherman and Lowe (1997) argue
that six threads run through employers’
search for a new model of management:
global integration, technological change,
innovations in work organization, business
rationalization, the pursuit of high per-
formance workplaces and new forms of
labour relations. We know little about the
extent to which most of these phenomena
apply to Canadian firms, let alone their
impact on labour-market outcomes or the
incomes of Canadians. Osberg et al. (1994)
provide interesting case study analyses
describing the effect of new management
principles on relationships within some
workplaces in Nova Scotia.
The Rapidly Increasing Human
Capital of Canadian Workers
While the above factors reflect changes
in labour demand, changes in labour supply
were perhaps equally dramatic. Most notably,
the supply of highly educated workers con-
tinued to increase at a remarkable rate in the
1990s, spurred on by the expansion of the
post-secondary education system begun in
the 1960s and the retirement of less-educat-
ed cohorts of workers (Riddell 1995). Within
the context of a general rise in the educa-
tional attainment of workers, there has also
been a shift in relative education levels. In
particular, the educational attainment of
older workers and younger women has been
rising faster than that of young men. Given
the strong association between education and
earnings, shifts in relative educational attain-
ment will contribute to shifts in relative
wages. The experience levels of Canadian
workers also rose during the 1990s, as the
workforce aged due to a maturation of the
“baby boom” generation. Because of rising
education levels and experience, the human
capital embedded in Canadian workers rose
significantly. Finally, historical increases in
women’s participation rates and their rapidly
rising educational attainment reflect impor-
tant social changes in Canada that have the
potential to affect the supply of skilled work-
ers, the relative earnings of men and women,
and the income of families.
Beyond the direct impact of a more
educated, experienced workforce on relative
and real earnings, Acemoglu (1998) and
Beaudry and Green (1999) argue that firms
invested more in technology in order to take
advantage of the rising educational attain-
ment of workers. According to this hypothe-
sis, the increased educational attainment of
the workforce has encouraged firms to alter
their production methods to make use of the
higher skills. A strong investment in tech-
nology tends to push down demand for
unskilled workers. This argument stands in
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change argument, wherein it is technology
that is the prime mover.
Changes in the Institutional
Landscape
The institutional landscape was also
altered during the 1990s. Substantial revi-
sions to Employment Insurance (EI) could
have influenced structural unemployment,
employment and the income of low-income
Canadians relative to earlier decades. Major
revisions to the social assistance system in
many provinces in the late-1980s (expansion)
and mid-1990s (contraction) and the intro-
duction of the child tax benefit system by the
federal government also could have affected
incomes and employment among low-
income Canadians. Minimum wages have
changed little since the early 1980s, but the
unionization rate has fallen (Sargent 2000).
Fortin and Lemieux (1997) found that dereg-
ulation, declining real minimum wages and
falling unionization were important deter-
minants of rising wage inequality in the
United States.
Aggregate Demand During the
1990s
Finally, all these changes took place
within a national context of weak aggregate
demand, which characterized the economy for
most of the decade. Real GDP grew almost 3
percent per year over the 1980s, but at only
1.8 percent per year from 1990 to 1998.
Associated with weak demand was weak
employment growth rooted in stagnant hir-
ing. The final years of the decade were years
of strong growth, however, with the economy
posting 4.5 and 4.7 percent real growth rates
in 1999 and 2000, respectively. Canada’s per-
formance in 2000 was impressive compared
with that of the other G7 nations, with only
the United States posting faster expansion
(Cross 2001). Growing aggregate demand
translated into growing employment, as the
unemployment rate fell to 6.8 percent, its
lowest annual level since the current labour-
force survey was begun in 1976. Mishel et al.
(2001) argue that persistently low unem-
ployment was a major factor behind faster
wage and income growth in the United States
in the late 1990s. Persistently low unem-
ployment, it is argued, helped raise growth in
productivity and gave workers an opportuni-
ty to shift away from contingent jobs.
Changes in aggregate demand over a business
cycle influence both relative and real wages.
Earnings inequality and low-income rates
tend to increase in economic contractions and
fall in expansions. This is an important con-
sideration when studying distributional
trends. In attempting to determine if there
are structural (i.e., longer-term and more per-
manent) changes in inequality and relative
earnings, it is necessary to abstract from cycli-
cal changes in aggregate demand and its effect
on inequality.
CHANGES IN INCOME AND 
EARNINGS INEQUALITY
Few labour-market issues have evoked
as much interest in the past two decades as
earnings and income inequality. Differing
trends among countries, particularly between
Canada and the United States, often lead to
confusion regarding Canadian outcomes.
Adding to the confusion is the fact that
trends may differ according to whether one
is referring to individual earnings inequali-
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ty, inequality in family market earnings, or
inequality in family disposable income. This
review focuses on all three levels, and con-
trasts Canadian outcomes with American.
Why focus on all three levels?
Inequality of earnings (wages) provides a
window on how the labour market is dis-
tributing employment earnings among indi-
vidual workers. It is primarily a reflection of
the interaction of labour supply and demand
forces, as well as the effect of institutional
features of a labour market (e.g., labour leg-
islation, minimum wage levels, social assis-
tance and EI regulations). Inequality of
family market earnings simply places indi-
vidual workers into families, determines fam-
ily earnings and adds investment earnings.
This relates more to the “welfare” of
Canadians than individual earnings inequal-
ity (which is more of a reflection of events in
the labour market), since it is concerned with
family outcomes. Finally, inequality of dis-
posable family income is the level at which
most analyses concerned with welfare or well-
being focus. Social transfer income (e.g.,
social assistance, public pensions, EI benefits,
tax credits) is added to market income, and
the distributive effects of taxes are included.
This provides a measure of how all monetary
income available to Canadian families is dis-
tributed. Changes in inequality at this level
reflect the distributional outcomes driven by
labour-market forces, government transfer
and taxation policies, and social forces affect-
ing family formation.
Earnings inequality rose in a number of
countries, including Canada, the United
States and the United Kingdom, between
the 1970s and 1980s. There was a substan-
tial fall in the earnings of lower-paid work-
ers, particularly males, while the earnings of
higher-paid workers either remained stable
or increased (Beach and Slotsve 1996;
Morissette et al. 1995). The Gini coefficient
is a well-known summary measure of
inequality. This measure takes on values
between 0 and 1, a higher value indicating
that earnings inequality is greater, and the
variation in earnings among workers has
increased. Earnings inequality tends to rise
in recessions and decline in economic expan-
sions, and hence when longer-term trends are
being sought, the years being considered
should be in the same part of the business
cycle (or the cyclical variation removed from
the series). In Canada, the Gini for individ-
ual employment earnings among men rose
from 0.351 in 1974 to 0.392 in 1985 (up
11.7 percent), then to 0.402 in 1995 (up
2.6 percent) (Table 1). Among women the
changes were less significant, up 5.4 per-
cent between 1974 and 1985 and steady
between 1985 and 1995. With the improv-
ing economy between 1995 and 1997,
Ginis fell for men and women. In the
United States, in contrast, earnings inequal-
ity for men rose steadily, up 9.5 percent
between 1974 and 1985 and up 10.4 per-
cent between 1985 and 1995. As in
Canada, changes in earnings inequality
among women were more muted.
However, with the rise in the share of
women working, the increased educational
attainment of young women and the contin-
ued movement of younger women into tra-
ditionally male occupations, women and men
are becoming increasingly integrated in the
labour market. From a labour-market per-
spective, the distinctions between them,
while still very evident, are declining. Hence
it is useful to view earnings inequality from
the perspective of all workers, men and
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labour market. In Canada, earnings inequal-
ity among all workers rose throughout the
1980s but increased little in the 1990s. The
Gini for all workers rose from 0.406 to 0.428
between 1974 and 1985. By 1995, however,
a year that is roughly in the same position in
the business cycle as 1985, no increase was
evident, and by 1997 the Gini had fallen
slightly. Although individual earnings
inequality rose in the 1980s, there is little
evidence of strong increases in Canada in the
1990s (Green 1999; Picot 1998; Wolfson
and Murphy 2000). In the United States, on
the other hand, earnings inequality contin-
ued to increase up to 1997 (Table 1).
However, earnings inequality repre-
sents a very broad and general indicator of
distributional features of the labour market.
No increase in inequality, as was the case in
Canada during the 1990s, does not imply
that there were no significant redistribution-
al events affecting particular groups or sub-
stantial shifts in relative wages. Such
movement can be offsetting, so that while
there are important changes in the earnings
of one group relative to another (say, younger
men compared to older men, or women com-
pared to men) overall inequality may not be
seen to increase. These and other trends offset
each other so that, among all workers, the
distribution of employment earnings
changed little in the 1990s (Picot 1998).
When earnings are aggregated to the
family level, inequality is seen as continuing
to increase in the 1990s. Data in Table 1 are
adult-equivalent adjusted, so change in the
size of families is accounted for and the
results include both individuals and families.
The Gini for family market earnings inequal-
ity rose from 0.389 in 1974 to 0.402 in
1985, and continued to rise to 0.427 in 1995
(and to 0.423 in 1997). From a welfare per-
spective, this is perhaps a more useful meas-
ure of earnings inequality than individual
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TABLE 1
Inequality in Individual Earnings, Family Market
Earnings and Disposable Family Income
(1992 dollars)
Gini Coefficient





Men 0.351 0.392 0.402 0.397
Women 0.407 0.426 0.421 0.411
Both 0.406 0.428 0.423 0.418
United States
Men 0.377 0.413 0.456 0.456
Women 0.425 0.428 0.441 0.439




Canada 0.389 0.402 0.427 0.423




Canada 0.303 0.293 0.291 0.292
United States 0.327 0.355 0.379 0.392
1 Includes paid-employment and self-employment earn-
ings. Includes persons aged 18–64 who earned more
than $500 during the year.
2 Based on economic families. Includes employment
earnings and investment income. Family earnings are
adult-equivalent adjusted (to account for economies of
scale associated with larger families) and the individual
is the unit of analysis. 
3 Based on economic families. Family income is adult-
equivalent adjusted, and each individual is assigned the
adult-equivalent adjusted family income. The individual is
the unit of analysis. Includes employment and investment
earnings, pension, social transfer income and taxes paid.
Source: Wolfson and Murphy (2000).
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between family and individual earnings
inequality primarily reflect changes in mar-
riage and family formation patterns.
Increasing numbers of single-parent families
(which tend to have low family earnings) and
an increasing tendency for “like” to marry
“like” (i.e., low earners marrying low earners,
high marrying high) resulted in rising
inequality in family market earnings, even
though inequality in individual earnings did
not rise in the 1990s (Zyblock 1997;
Wolfson and Murphy 2000).
When one considers only income meas-
ures, as we are here (i.e., excluding references
to wealth and other aspects of economic well-
being), perhaps the best reflection of changes
in the relative “economic welfare” of
Canadians is inequality in family disposable
income. Family disposable income reflects the
distribution of total monetary income avail-
able to families, including earnings, pensions,
social transfers, and other market and non-
market sources of income, and also accounts
for the effect of personal income taxes on
inequality. There was little change in family
income inequality throughout the 1970s,
1980s and most of the 1990s (Wolfson and
Murphy 1998). The Gini was 0.303 in 1974
and 0.293 in 1985, and remained at that
level, registering 0.292 in 1997 (Table 1).
Generally speaking, family income inequality
has changed little over the past 30 years. This
is because employment earnings losses among
lower-income families were largely replaced
by increases in social transfer payments (e.g.,
social assistance, EI benefits, rising public
pension income, child tax credit) throughout
the 1980s in particular. More recent data do
suggest that family income inequality may
have increased in 1997-98.
Chart 1 shows Gini coefficients from
1989 through 1998. For families only (exclud-
ing unattached individuals), the level of dis-
posable income inequality was steady from
1989 through 1995, at a seven-year average of
0.294, and rose to between 0.312 and 0.315
in 1997-98. Similarly, disposable income
inequality among unattached individuals was
steady between 1989 and 1995 at an average
of 0.337, rising to an average of 0.354
between 1996 and 1998. However, these fig-
ures are not adult-equivalent adjusted, and
changes in data collection over this period may
also have affected these results.1 More research
is needed to better understand the change in
family income inequality during the late
1990s. In the United States, on the other
hand, family income inequality increased
steadily. The Gini rose from 0.421 in 1974 to
0.459 in 1985 and 0.502 by 1997 (Table 1).
Although the United States was faced with an
increase in earnings inequality similar to that
in Canada during the 1980s, the US transfer
system did not similarly respond to prevent
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economic families with two
or more members
CHART 1
Inequality of Family Disposable Income, Gini
Coefficients
Source: Statistics Canada (2000).
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less skilled workers. However, the two con-
cepts are not synonymous. Inequality trends
include changes in relative wages not only
among groups (defined by age, education,
gender, etc.) but also within groups. And
changes in within-group inequality have
been a very important, though often ignored,
part of the inequality story. Furthermore,
aggregate inequality measures, such as the
Ginis presented above, can show little change
while beneath this apparent stability lies
important, and offsetting, movement in the
relative wages of various groups. Here, we
focus on the changes in the relative earnings
of older and younger workers, the more and
less educated, and men and women. These
are topics that have received considerable
attention in recent decades.
Declining Real Earnings 
Among Young Workers,
Particularly Men
Cross-sectional data clearly indicate a
widening earnings gap between younger and
older workers, particularly among men, in the
1980s and 1990s. This was related mainly to
a fall in the real earnings of young male work-
ers (Betcherman and Morissette 1994; Picot
1998). Real weekly earnings of young men
(under 35) working full-time fell throughout
the recessions of both the early 1980s and the
1990s. Modest increases for 18-24-year-olds
during the 1980s expansion, and for both 18-
24 year-olds and 25-34-year-olds during the
late 1990s expansion, failed to fully offset
these declines. Meanwhile, earnings rose for
older men (aged 45-64), further widening the
wage gap (Chart 2). For women, earnings
declined only for the youngest group, the 18-
24-year-olds (Chart 3).2 Rising relative wages
Andrew Heisz, Andrew Jackson 
and Garnett Picot
increases in inequality (Blank and Hanratty
1993). Much of the common perception in
Canada that family income inequality has
increased during the past three decades may
well stem from these American results.
As noted earlier, inequality and relative
wages can change significantly over a business
cycle. In particular, during periods of low
unemployment and relatively high labour
demand late in an economic expansion, the
relative position of low-wage workers can
improve. Mishel et al. (2001) examined US
wage inequality in the 1990s. They found that
since 1995 low earners had been closing the
gap between them and middle- and working-
class workers, while the top earners continued
to pull away from the middle. Regarding fam-
ily income inequality, in the second half of the
1990s the top continued to pull away from the
middle and the middle to pull away from the
bottom. The authors argue that persistently
low unemployment in the late 1990s, coupled
with rising minimum wages throughout the
decade (after declines in the 1980s), con-
tributed to improvement at the bottom of the
distribution, while globalization, deunioniza-
tion and the shift to low-paying industries
kept wages at the top growing. In contrast,
distributional changes appeared to be unrelat-
ed to technological change. One of their find-
ings is that employers in the high-technology
sector have not been the source of growth in
employment, nor have they been wage leaders
(in terms of growth), in the United States.
CHANGES IN RELATIVE EARNINGS
Changes in inequality are in general
related to changes in relative earnings among
groups — for example, older compared to
254
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returns to experience. Young workers may
start out with relatively low earnings but catch
up as they age and gain experience. However,
this does not appear to be the case. Beaudry
and Green (2000b) found that when successive
cohorts of men were examined as they entered
the labour market and gained experience, the
age-earnings profile shifted downward for the
more recent cohorts. Wages have fallen for
young men entering the labour market, and
do not catch up to those of earlier cohorts as
the men gain experience. This decline in
wages was observed for both the more and the
less educated. More recent work using data
from a longitudinal graduates survey uncov-
ered similar trends for male bachelor gradu-
ates, although the magnitude of the decline
was not as great over the 1990s (Finnie 2001).
Little is known about the cause of the
declining earnings, both real and relative (to
earlier cohorts), of young workers, men in
particular. Changes in supply do not explain
the drop, since the supply of younger workers
has been falling, not rising, both in absolute
terms and relative to the overall supply of
labour; this would tend to increase rather
than reduce relative wages.
Proponents of the skill-biased techno-
logical change hypothesis draw a connection
between increasing returns to skill and changes
in the distribution of earnings by age. These
influential authors argue that skill-biased tech-
nological changes increased the demand for
skills of all types and that rising male earnings
inequality was consistent with increasing
returns to experience or age (Juhn et al. 1993;
Katz and Murphy 1992; Bound and Johnston
1992; Davis 1992).
As was the case with the role of tech-
nological change explaining the shifts in rel-
ative earnings by education level, some argue
that the role of technological change in
explaining falling real wages among young
men may also have been overstated. Green
(1999) and Sargent (2000) argue that the
changes in labour-market outcomes and
industrial structure that prevailed in the
1990s are not necessarily the changes one
might expect to see in an economy where
technological change is driving structural
change. Changes in information technology
have clearly had an impact on labour-market
outcomes for workers, and are part of the evo-
lution of the 1990s labour market. But some
important phenomena cannot be explained
and are at times inconsistent with the belief
that technology is the sole driving force, or
perhaps even the primary one.
For example, earnings inequality in
Canada has risen and continues to rise among
men but has changed little among women
(Picot 1998). Green (1999) asks how one can
reconcile this fact with technological change,
which presumably continued into the 1990s
and should have affected women as well as
men. Also, as discussed above, wages have
declined across cohorts — increasing returns
to experience have not taken place within
cohorts — so there is little validity to the
argument that increasing wage premiums for
experience is consistent with the effects of
technological change (Beaudry and Green
2000b). And if technological change in the
shift to the knowledge-based economy is
boosting the demand for skilled labour, why
have the earnings of young men been falling?
It is among the young that computer-relat-
ed skills are the highest.
In the United States, where the increase
in the wage premium for education and expe-
rience has been substantial, the increase
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overall rise in inequality. The remainder is
found within groups of similar educational
attainment and experience (Mishel and
Bernstein 2001). Hence, even if the rise in the
education and experience wage premium were
fully driven by technology, much of the over-
all increase in earnings inequality remains
unexplained. However, technology likely is
only one of several factors that explain this
premium. The others include a drop in the
real federal minimum wage over the 1980s
and a continued decline in unionization in the
United States (Mishel and Bernstein 2001).
These and other inconsistencies in the evi-
dence supporting the skill-biased technolog-
ical change hypothesis have encouraged
researchers to look to other explanations such
as the impact of changes in institutions, as
argued by Fortin and Lemieux (1997).
It may be that changes in labour sup-
ply partly explain why young males in par-
ticular saw their relative earnings fall. This
relates especially to the rising education lev-
els of older workers and younger women. In
1981, 16.4 percent of men aged 25 to 34
held a degree, compared with 11.8 percent
of men aged 45 to 54. By 1995, the gap had
disappeared, the numbers rising to 22.2 and
22.5 percent, respectively; both age groups
had become much more educated, particu-
larly the older group. The gap did not close
to the same extent for women, largely
because of the dramatic increase in the edu-
cational attainment of young women. In
1981, 16.6 percent of younger women held
a degree, compared to 6.9 percent of older
women. By 1995, the figures had risen to
25.3 (higher than for young men) and 19.2
percent, respectively. The rapid increase
among 45 to 54-year-old workers was related
to the rapid increase in university enrolment
rates during the 1960s and early 1970s: these
cohorts were now moving into the 45-54 age
group, replacing much less educated cohorts.
Kapsalis et al. (1999) conclude that the
changing relative educational levels of the
young and old accounted for about one quar-
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ter of the widening cross-sectional earnings
gap between younger and older workers in
the 1980s and, even a larger share during the
1990s. We discuss the declining education-
al advantage of young men in more detail
later in this article.
Wage Premium for Higher
Education: No Marked Increase
Among Workers Overall,  Rising
Among Younger Workers
The basic facts suggest that in Canada
throughout the 1980s and up to the mid-
1990s, there was no overall increase in the
returns to education (Morissette et al. 1994;
Bar-Or et al. 1993; Beach and Slotsve 1996).
This is in contrast to developments in the
United States, where the wage premium rose
among the more highly educated (Juhn et al.
1993; Freeman and Needels 1991).
There is a developing literature on the
role played by technological change in
explaining the phenomenon of increasing rel-
ative wages for more educated Americans.
According to the skill-biased technological
change hypothesis, technological change has
increased the demand for highly skilled
workers. This would result in increased
wages for this group relative to the less
skilled — unless wages were highly rigid,
causing a shift in relative employment, or the
supply of educated workers rose sufficiently
to offset demand.
Interestingly, neither relative wages nor
employment rates appear to have changed sig-
nificantly for the more highly educated in
Canada among workers as a whole. The
employment-to-population ratios of those
with a university or high-school education
show no relative gain among the educated in
terms of the likelihood of being employed,
although for those with less than a high
school education there has been a drop in the
likelihood of being employed (Sargent 2000).
It is not that the relative position of the very
highly educated improved, but that the posi-
tion of the least educated deteriorated. One
explanation for this stable pattern of relative
earnings in Canada, which is consistent with
the skill-biased technological change hypoth-
esis, is that the relative supply of highly edu-
cated workers increased at a rate that offset
the increase in the relative demand. Increases
in supply offset increased demand caused by
technological change, resulting in little
change in the relative labour-market status of
skilled and unskilled workers (Freeman and
Needels 1991; Murphy et al. 1998). This is a
commonly accepted explanation of the differ-
ence between Canada and the United States
with respect to changing relative wages
among the highly educated. Riddell and
Sweetman (2001) examine labour market out-
comes of the more and less educated and find
substantial evidence consistent with the view
that there has been a steady increase in the
demand for skills in Canada.
A second hypothesis, recently put forth
by Beaudry and Green (1999), argues that
the role of technological change in the rela-
tive earnings gap in the United States may
be overstated. They argue that firms invest-
ed more in technology in order to take
advantage of the rising educational attain-
ment of workers. According to this model,
sometimes called the “endogenous technical
choice” hypothesis, the increased education-
al attainment of the workplace has encour-
aged firms to adapt their production methods
to make use of the higher skills. When firms
invest heavily in technology, the demand for
unskilled workers tends to go down. In this
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ment of the workforce that is the principal
cause of many of the changes in the relative
wages. This possibility is also stressed in the-
oretical work by Acemoglu (1998).
A third explanation, which has
received less attention in Canada, is that
institutional factors underlie the changes in
real wages. Fortin and Lemieux (1997) found
that declining real minimum wages, falling
unionization and deregulation were impor-
tant determinants of rising wage inequality
in the United States.
The relative merit of these explanations
continues to be debated. Most recently
Beaudry and Green (2000a) compared the
changing structure of wages in the United
States and Germany over the past 20 years.
They point out that while the educational
composition of the two workforces evolved
similarly, the wage premium for education
rose more in the United States. The OECD
(1994) offers the explanation that because
Germany had relatively rigid wages, skill-
biased technological change manifested itself
in rising unemployment rates among the less
skilled. Beaudry and Green (2000a) offer the
alternative hypothesis that the United States
under-accumulated physical capital relative
to human capital, while Germany invested in
a more balanced manner; Germany’s more
rapid accumulation of physical capital helped
ensure sufficient demand and productivity
gains for less-skilled workers that kept their
wages from declining. In addition, Kuhn
(2001) concludes that differences in labour
market rigidities between Canada and the US
are unlikely to explain much of the Canada-
US unemployment rate gap.
In any case, to state that there has been
no increase in the education premium for
workers in Canada is to obscure relative
changes within some groups. Bar-Or et al.
(1995) examined wages by education group
from 1971 to 1991 using Survey of
Consumer Finances data. They found that
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CHART 4
Average Real Weekly Wages, 20–34 Age Group, 1997–2000
Source: Labour Force Survey.
heisz.qxd  24/05/01  9:54 AM  Page 258returns to higher education did not rise in
the 1980s except among the youngest group
(those with experience levels of one to
five years), who saw modest increases.
Furthermore, recent data from the Labour
Force Survey show that the earnings of young
university-educated workers, both real and
relative to the less educated, have increased
in recent years. Chart 4 shows average real
weekly wages for the 20-34 age group from
1997 (the first year the LFS collected wage
information) to 2000. While other groups
stagnated in earnings, young men, in partic-
ular those with university degrees, enjoyed
small wage increases over these years.
THE SHIFTING RELATIVE LABOUR
MARKET POSITION OF MEN AND
WOMEN
The changing relative position of
women and men is one of the more interest-
ing labour-market phenomena of the past
two decades, and one that may not be receiv-
ing the attention it is due. The changing
position of women has several dimensions.
Young women have rapidly increased their
education levels relative to men. They are
occupying more jobs, and while wages
remain lower for women, the gap is closing.
Generally speaking, the likelihood of being
employed has increased for women and
declined for men, while that of being unem-
ployed has increased for men and declined for
women. The offsetting trends between the
two groups are seen in earnings levels, earn-
ings inequality, the likelihood of being
employed (employment-to-population ratios)
and the likelihood of being unemployed. We
discuss each of these in turn below.
Educational Attainment Rising
Faster for Women
Women have increased their education-
al attainment, both in real terms and, perhaps
more significantly, relative to men. For exam-
ple, between 1976 and 1998 the fraction of
women in the labour force with a university
degree increased by 7.7 percent a year, com-
pared to 4.2 percent for men. The result is that
the gap between men and women in the share
holding a degree disappeared by 1998. In fact,
the 1976 educational advantage of younger
men (over younger women and older men) had
more than disappeared by 1998, at which time
a larger share of young (25 to 34-year-old)
women than men held a degree (Chart 5).
Since human capital is a major determinant of
labour-market outcomes, it should not be sur-
prising to learn that the relative earnings,
employment and unemployment of women are
improving. However, there are likely other fac-
tors at play. Picot and Heisz (2000) note that
even after controlling for change in human
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employment and unemployment outcomes
deteriorated for men but not for highly edu-
cated women and relatively little for other
women. And, as will be shown below, even after
controlling for broad education and age (expe-
rience) levels, women’s earnings rose more rap-
idly than men’s in the first half of the 1990s.
Narrowing of Male-Female
Earnings Gap
While aggregate data indicate that
women continue to earn less than men, the
gap has been narrowing. The ratio of annual
earnings of women to men working full-year
full-time rose from 58.4 percent in 1967 to
72.5 percent in 1997 (Survey of Consumer
Finances data). Annual earnings are not the
best indicator of relative wages, however,
since they do not fully control for weeks
worked in the year or hours worked per
week, which are known to be higher for men.
Drolet (2000) found that in 1997 the raw
hourly wage ratio of women to men was 80
percent, but increased to 89 percent after
controlling for a host of human-capital, pro-
ductivity-related, and industrial and occupa-
tional characteristics.
And over the 1990s, women’s aggregate
earnings increased much more quickly than
men’s. The weekly earnings of female full-time
workers increased significantly more in the
1990s than in the 1980s, rising 13 percent
between 1989 and 2000 (Chart 6). Weekly
earnings were stable among comparable male
workers. Controlling for age, education, full-
time/part-time status and industry produces
much the same results. Kapsalis et al. (1999)
ran wage equations for men and women (sep-
arately) in different age groups and computed
expected weekly earnings, controlling for
industry, region and full-time/part-time status.
During the 1989-95 period, the growth in
expected weekly earnings was greater for
women than men (except among the universi-
ty educated) (Chart 7). Basically, men’s weekly
earnings were declining and women’s were ris-
ing. Evidence based on annual earnings sug-
gests that this phenomenon is independent of
260
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Growth in Average Weekly Earnings,
1989–95
Source: Kapsalis et al. (1999).
heisz.qxd  24/05/01  9:54 AM  Page 260location in the earnings distribution. The
growth in annual earnings of women has far
outstripped that of men across the entire earn-
ings distribution. Between 1986 and 1995,
two years roughly comparable in terms of posi-
tion in the business cycle, women’s annual
earnings rose 10.6 percent and men’s fell by 1
percent. Except for women at the very bottom
of the earnings distribution (where earnings
rose by only 0.4 percent), earnings growth was
between 9 and 11 percent. Men’s earnings fell
across the entire earnings distribution except
among those in the top two deciles, where
there were earnings gains (Chart 8). There are
numerous possible reasons for these phenome-
na. Women are moving into higher-paid occu-
pations and fields of study at an increasing rate,
and such effects would not necessarily be con-
trolled for in the broad type of controls used in
the work reported here. The wage gap has been
narrowing for male and female graduates, and
the higher the education level, the narrower
the gap. Finnie and Wannell (1999) found that
among the latest cohort of graduates in their
study (1990), the male/female wage gap for
doctoral graduates had disappeared, at least
during the five years following graduation.
Employment Indicators
Improving for Prime-Aged
Women Relative to Men
Earnings growth during the 1990s was
largely positive for women and stable or
declining for men. This dichotomy is reflect-
ed in employment and unemployment out-
comes as well. There may be special
conditions influencing the outcomes of
younger workers (changing employment pat-
terns among students) and older workers
(increasing early retirement), which could
affect the relative positions of men and
women. Hence we focus on prime-aged
workers, those 25 to 54 years old. Labour-
force statistics suggest that the position of
prime-aged men deteriorated between the
late 1980s and the late 1990s, while that of
women improved. We computed average
employment and unemployment rates for the
1987-89 period and compared them to aver-
age rates for the 1998-2000 period. These
two periods are at a roughly comparable posi-
tion in the business cycle (approaching the
cyclical peak), and hence the comparisons
represent a structural change between the
decades, not just cyclical variation.
Labour-force participation fell for men
(by 2.7 percent) and rose for women (by 7.2
percent) (Table 2). The unemployment rate
remained largely unchanged for men (falling
0.1 percentage points) but fell substantially
for women (1.5 percentage points). Hence,
while unemployment was higher among
women during the 1980s, this situation was
reversed by 1998-2000. The employment-to-
population ratio fell for men (2.6 percent) and
rose for women (8.9 percent). The one statis-
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ment duration, which rose by 11.7 percent
among women but declined marginally
among men (2.8 percent) — comparing
1984-86 to 1994-96, the most recent years
for which data are available. These changes in
duration were more than offset by increases in
the incidence of unemployment among men
and declines among women (by 15.7 percent).
Changes seen in the cross-section are
reflected in similar change by age cohort.
Beaudry and Green (2001) compare high-
school and university graduates for 1971-1993,
tracing the employment of various cohorts of
labour market entrants as they age. Cohorts of
male high-school graduates entering later in
this period did poorly relative to those that
entered earlier. Men with university degrees
and women saw only small secular declines.
There are certainly many reasons for
this change in relative labour-market posi-
tion. These include changes in the types of
jobs held by women and the industries in
which women work. However, little is
known about these relative shifts in earnings,
employment and unemployment. This
remains one area requiring further research.
LOW-INCOME TRENDS 
IN THE 1990S
While inequality measures indicate
how income is distributed among all
Canadians, low-income measures focus on the
families at the bottom of the distribution.
Traditionally, analysis focuses on the share of
the population below some low-income cut-
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1987–89 1998–2000 % Change Difference
Labour-Force Participation Rate All 83.2 84.6 1.6 1.3
Men 93.6 91.1 -2.7 -2.5
Women 72.9 78.1 7.2 5.2
Unemployment Rate All 7.2 6.4 -10.2 -0.7
Men 6.6 6.5 -2.0 -0.1
Women 7.9 6.3 -19.5 -1.5
Employment to Population All 77.3 79.1 2.4 1.9
Men 87.4 85.1 -2.6 -2.2
Women 67.2 73.1 8.9 6.0
1984–86 1994–96 % Change Difference
Inflows to Unemployment1,2
All 1.95 1.86 -4.4 -0.1
Men 1.73 1.84 6.1 0.1
Women 2.25 1.89 -15.7 -0.4
Duration of Unemployment 
(Months)2 All 4.3 4.4 2.5 0.1
Men 4.6 4.5 -2.8 -0.1
Women 3.8 4.3 11.7 0.4
1 Fraction of labour force entering unemployment.
2 1996 is the most recent year available for inflows to and duration of unemployment.
Source: Labour Force Survey.
TABLE 2
Labour Force Statistics, Prime-Aged Workers (25-54 Age Group)
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this rate is rising or falling, and why. But it is
also important to know whether the families
in low income are better or worse off than
they were in the past. This is determined by
the low-income gap (the income gap between
the low-income cut-off and average family
income among low-income families). A final
important dimension of low income is its
persistence. How long do families tend to
stay in low income once there? If families are
“trapped” in low income for many years, this
represents a more serious issue than if fami-
lies move relatively quickly in and out of low
income. This section discusses trends in these
three components — the low-income rate,
the low-income gap and the persistence of
low income among Canadian families.
The Low-Income Rate
There are a number of low-income cut-
offs in use. If a family’s income falls below
the cut-off, it is said to be in the low-income
population. Here we use Statistics Canada’s
LICO (low-income cut-off) based on after-tax
and transfer income (i.e., disposable income).
In 1998 dollars, the post-tax LICO in a large
urban centre was $14,510 for a single person
and $27,890 for a family of four. How did
the low-income rate fare in the 1990s rela-
tive to the 1980s? In answering this question
it is important to separate cyclical variation
from longer-term trends. Low-income rates
always rise in recessions and fall during eco-
nomic expansions. Chart 9 shows the rate of
low income among all Canadians (based on
after-tax income) for the period 1980-98. It
also plots the unemployment rate. Cyclical
movements in the low-income rate mirrored
cyclical changes in the unemployment rate,
at least up to 1994 (the correlation coefficient
over the period 1980-94 was 0.85).
Following 1994, trends in low income
diverged from the unemployment rate such
that 1996 and 1997 were peak years for low
income despite improving labour markets.
The low-income rate recovered somewhat
between 1997 and 1998, but by 1998 had
not fully returned to the level expected based
on the business cycle.
Table 3 provides data on persons in low
income (based on post-tax LICO) for 1981,
1988, 1989 (the cyclical peak year during the
1980s), 1993 (when the overall economic
recovery began to take hold) and 1998. As
shown, the overall low-income rate for all
persons in 1998 was 12.2 percent, down
from 13.1 percent in 1993 but 1.1 percent-
age points above the 11.1 percent level of
1988, a year roughly comparable in terms of
position in the business cycle. Overall, the
low-income rate was somewhat higher dur-
ing the 1990s than the 1980s. It rose for four
years following the end of the recession
(1992), peaking in 1996. This increase
occurred in spite of a slowly recovering econ-
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CHART 9
Low-Income and Unemployment Rates
Source: Labour Force Survey, Statistics Canada (1997a).
heisz.qxd  24/05/01  9:54 AM  Page 263omy and falling unemployment. During the
1980s the increase lasted only one year after
the end of the recession (1982), peaking in
1983. Various groups were affected in differ-
ent ways. Among seniors, low-income rates
— already very low for seniors in families —
fell in the 1990s. Among the population
aged 18-64, in contrast, low-income rates
were higher in 1998 than in 1988. This rise
was observed among both singles (increasing
4.9 percentage points between 1988 and
1998) and families (increasing 1.3 percent-
age points between 1988 and 1998).
The low-income rate of children
dropped from the cyclical high of 17.2 per-
cent in 1996 to 13.8 percent in 1998.
However, the rate in 1998 was still above the
12.5 percent posted in 1988. The low-
income rate was higher in the late 1990s
than the late 1980s. The opposite trend was
observed during the 1980s; the low-income
rate among children fell from 12.5 percent
in 1981 to 11.8 percent in 1989 (comparing
cyclical peaks).
Why this increase in the incidence of
low income between 1988 and 1998? Picot,
Morissette and Myles (2001) found that the
key driver of the trend among the population
under age 65 was the inability of the labour
market to provide as much employment
income to low-income working-age house-
holds in the 1990s as in the 1980s. They
found that virtually all of the 1.1 percent
increase in the low-income rate over the
1988-98 period was associated with declines
in employment earnings among families;
changes in transfer benefits neither offset
these changes in employment earnings (as
they did during the 1980s) nor contributed
directly to an increase in the low-income
rate. They found, however, that during the
1993-96 period alone, when the low-income
rate deviated from its expected trend based
on movement in the unemployment rate
(Chart 9), all of the unexpected increase was
due to changes in transfers (e.g., EI benefits,
social assistance, child tax benefits) received
by low-income families. For the entire 1988-
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% of Low-Income
1981 1988 1989 1993 1998 Population (1998)
All 11.7 11.1 10.2 13.1 12.2 100
Men 10.0 9.5 8.8 12.0 11.4 46.1
Women 13.5 12.6 11.5 14.3 13.0 53.9
Elderly 8.7
In families 7.2 4.1 3.1 3.3 3.0 2.0
Single 49.1 30.6 27.3 26.3 20.8 6.7
Children (<18) 12.5 12.5 11.8 15.9 13.8 24.8
Two-parent families n/a n/a 7.0 9.9 8.3 13.0
Single-parent families n/a n/a 48.0 48.6 45.3 11.8
Aged 18–64 in families 7.3 6.8 6.4 8.9 8.1 35.9
Aged 18–64 single 29.9 29.3 27.9 32.7 33.9 28.4
n/aData are not available for these subgroups.
Source: Statistics Canada (1997a, Table 3; 2000, Table 8.1).
TABLE 3
Low-Income Rate (After Tax) by Gender, Age and Family Status (percentage)
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in benefits were offset by increases during
other parts of the decade. Hence, over the
decade as a whole the main story rests with
poor growth in employment earnings. This
decline in employment earnings among poor-
er families was observed in the 1980s as well,
but rising social transfer payments more than
offset the earnings decline and the low-
income rate actually fell. Social transfers did
not offset earnings losses during the 1990s.
There was substantial variation by
province, and the impact of changes in earn-
ings on low income was more severe in cen-
tral and eastern Canada than in the West,
because during the early 1990s the recession
was more severe in this part of Canada than




varies according to the population group
being considered. Although studies of
domestic low income typically rely on
Statistics Canada’s LICO, for international
comparisons the standard is the low-income
measure, or LIM, which sets the low-income
cut-off at one half the median family income
in the country of interest.3
In the mid-1990s, the overall incidence
of low income after tax using this measure
was 11.2 percent in Canada, far below the
17.7 percent in the United States but well
above the 6.5 percent in Sweden (OECD
1998b). Canada was in the middle of the
pack internationally when the focus is low
income among children, but was one of the
best countries in terms of low income among
the elderly. The United Nations agency
UNICEF recently reported that in the 1990s
the child low-income rate (falling below one
half of the median household income) in
Canada was 15.5 percent, compared to 22.4
percent in the United States and just 2.6 per-
cent in Sweden, but the low-income rate
among the elderly, defined on the same basis,
was just 4.8 percent in Canada, compared to
23.7 percent in the United States and 6.0
percent in Sweden (UNICEF 2000). Osberg
(2000) found that due to the increase in
Canadian low-income rates during the
1990s, the gap between Canadian and
American rates narrowed in that decade, to
the extent that some US states had low-
income rates below some Canadian provinces.
This was not the case in the 1980s.
Depth of Low Income
The economist Amartya Sen, a Nobel
laureate, has pointed out that the proportion
of the population living in poverty (the
poverty rate) could be perversely reduced by
redistributing income from the very poor to
those just under the poverty line. This would
move those receiving income over the low-
income cut-off but leave the very poor much
worse off. Low-income would be seen to be
falling, however. This illustrates the fact that
the proportion of the population falling
below a low-income line is at best a partial
measure. It tells us nothing about the depth
of low income or whether the economic posi-
tion of those in low income is deteriorating
or improving through time.
The low-income gap is a measure of
the depth of low income. It is the difference
between the LICO and the average income of
low-income individuals and families. This
gap narrowed significantly over the 1980s; it
was at $6,400 in 1989, falling from $7,100
in 1981, both cyclical peaks. Picot et al.
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largely driven by increases in social transfer
payments received by families over this peri-
od, and was registered in spite of falling earn-
ings among low-income families. The
low-income gap widened during the reces-
sion of 1991-92, as one might expect, but,
surprisingly, continued to widen until 1997,
in spite of substantial economic growth later
in the decade (Chart 10). Picot et al. (2001)
examined the low-income rate and gap over
the 1988-98 period among the population
aged 18-64. They found that the average
family income of low-income families was
30.8 percent below the after-tax LICO in
1988 and 33.6 percent below in 1998 — the
gap widened continuously through to 1998
in spite of substantial economic recovery.
This increase in the size of the gap stemmed
from changes both in the benefits that low-
income families receive from the transfer sys-
tem and in the employment earnings of
low-income families.
Of the increase in the low-income gap
between 1988 and 1998, approximately 60
percent was due to declines in employment
earnings and 40 percent to changes in bene-
fits received from the transfer system. The
transfer system often has a greater influence
on the low-income gap than the low-income
rate, since transfers are frequently targeted at
families well below the LICO. The benefits
received may improve a family’s financial posi-
tion but not necessarily move it over the low-
income threshold. The widening of the
low-income gap during the 1990s was most
evident in Alberta and, in that case, was relat-
ed primarily to changes in the social transfer
payments received by low-income families.
Persistence of Low Income
Information on the duration of low
income did not come to light until the
1990s, with the advent of surveys like the
Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics
(SLID) and the Longitudinal Administrative
Database (LAD), both of which follow pan-
els of people over time. It is now clear that a
large group of Canadians regularly move in
and out of low income, while a much small-
er proportion are stuck in this situation over
several years. According to research using
SLID, in the six years from 1993 to 1998 just
under one in four Canadians (24.2 percent)
experienced low income at least once, double
the rate of low income in the single year of
1998. Of the group experiencing low income
at least once, about half (12.8 percent) spent
“only” one or two years in low income, the
other half spent a more significant period —
three to six years. Just over 5 percent of
Canadians, or one in 20, spent either five or
all six years of the 1993-98 period in low
income (Statistics Canada 1998, Table 8.2).
About 8 percent spent four years in low
income during that period (Morissette and
Zhang 2001). Data from the SLID would
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5 to 8 percent of Canadians are experiencing
a persistent spell of low income.
Finnie (2000), using LAD, found sim-
ilar patterns. Examining the years 1992-96,
Finnie found that 26.4 percent of the popu-
lation were in low income at some point and
6.9 percent of the population were in low
income for all of the five years.
Hence, approximately 6 to 8 percent of
the population were, during the mid- to late
1990s, persistently in low income. This per-
sistence was much stronger among certain
groups. Morissette and Zhang (2001) found
that the group in low income for at least four
of the six years was proportionately above aver-
age for persons in single-parent families (28
percent), unattached persons (22 percent), per-
sons with work limitations (15 percent), persons
from visible minorities (11 percent), recent
immigrants (10 percent) and persons with less
than a high-school education (9 percent).
The duration of low income, as
opposed to the share of the population in per-
sistent low income during a given period, is
another matter. To address this issue, one
must focus on new spells of low income start-
ing in, say, 1994 or 1995. Morissette and
Zhang (2001) found that of these new spells,
approximately 50 to 60 percent lasted one
year or less and 30 to 35 percent three years
or more. Hence most new spells of low
income are relatively short. Of all the people
entering low income in any given year, the
majority will spend one or two years at most
in low income. However, perhaps one third
of those people will be in low income on a
persistent basis.
Some recent work has focused on the
factors behind the movement of children into
and out of low income. Picot et al. (1999)
found that family formation events such as
marriage and divorce are significant deter-
minants of the movement in or out of low
income, although labour market events such
as unemployment or a change in the number
of earners in a family tend to dominate.
Finnie (2000) found that becoming a single
parent and leaving home as a young adult
were strongly associated with entry into low
income. Likewise, becoming attached has
been found to be associated with leaving low
income, for both single parents and other
unattached individuals.
SUMMARY
The major distributional changes in
the 1990s were:
> inequality of individual earnings: no
increase overall, but important increas-
es among men;
> inequality of family earnings: an
increase as the proportion of single-par-
ent families grew and “like married
like” more often;
> inequality of family disposable income:
little change over the period 1970s to
mid-1990s, as the tax/transfer system
served to mitigate the polarization of
family earnings; evidence of an increase
at the end of the 1990s;
> real earnings of young men: continued
decline up to 1996, followed by mod-
est recovery between 1996 and 2000 as
the economy strengthened;
> real weekly wages of university edu-
cated 20 to 34-year-olds: recent rise;
> labour-market outcomes: significant
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1980s; 
> depth of low income: a deterioration (on
average), even during the strong eco-
nomic recovery up to 1998, following
substantial improvement in the 1980s.
CONCLUSION
Inequality arose as a prominent issue in
the mid-1980s and has remained near the top
of the list of policy issues ever since.
Researchers noted that earnings inequality
was rising in the late 1970 and the 1980s,
after years without changing. In some coun-
tries, family income inequality followed suit,
but not in Canada. Earnings inequality
among men continued its upward path in the
1990s in Canada, but when all workers are
considered, there is little evidence of a rapid
rise such as that observed in the 1980s.
However, family earnings inequality did con-
tinue its upward march during the 1990s.
There remains substantial uncertainty regard-
ing the cause of this rise in inequality. While
skill-biased technological change is the most
frequent explanation, there are reasons to
believe that numerous other factors are
involved. There are many dimensions to the
earnings inequality story, such as shifting rel-
ative wages among groups (young and old,
less and more highly educated, men and
women, etc.) as well as changing inequality
within groups. It seems unlikely that one sin-
gle explanation such as technological change
can account for all of these underlying trends.
Shifts in the characteristics of workers,
notably rising educational attainment, are
likely to play a substantial role, as are changes
in family formation patterns and institution-
al factors such as unionization rates, mini-
mum wages, EI and social assistance.
One of the most striking outcomes of
the 1990s labour market is the improved sit-
uation of women and deteriorated situation of
men. It is likely that these results are associ-
ated with improvements in the educational
attainment of women, and changes in the
types of fields they study and occupations
they enter, but much remains unknown
regarding these outcomes. In spite of the shift
to the knowledge-based economy, it has been
known for some time that there has not been
an increase in the relative earnings and like-
lihood of employment among more highly
educated workers in Canada, except perhaps
among the younger cohorts. More highly edu-
cated workers do show higher earnings and a
greater likelihood of being employed than less
educated workers, but no more so than they
used to. Research suggests that the rapid
increase in the supply of highly educated
workers in Canada offset an increase in the
demand for their labour. This may be not be
the case for recent young cohorts who have
seen a relative rise in earnings.
The earnings of young males have fall-
en in Canada. Research suggests that this
drop may reflect a downward shift in the age-
earnings profile of recent cohorts of workforce
entrants. While some improvement in the
earning position of young men was observed
during the rapid expansion of the very late
1990s, this did not offset the earlier declines.
The causes of this deterioration are not well
understood. The drop could relate to the
declining relative education position of
young men, abnormally low hiring rates dur-
ing the 1990s in Canadian companies (weak
labour demand) or, possibly, declining rates
of unionization among younger workers.
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distribution continued to be negatively
affected by poor labour-market outcomes
throughout the 1990s, as they had through-
out the 1980s. Employment earnings among
poorer families declined in both decades, con-
tinuing to fall even during the 1996-98
expansion. There has been considerable
debate regarding the extent to which the
earnings declines in the 1980s were related
to rising social assistance benefits. Clearly,
there is a “work disincentive effect” associat-
ed with rising benefits, but what is its mag-
nitude? For some groups, such as single
mothers, who have a strong incentive to
remain at home and unemployed if there is
some other source of income, the effect could
be significant. For others it is unclear.
During the 1990s, social assistance and
EI benefits were being reduced in most
provinces. In many cases, employment earn-
ings and social assistance benefits were falling
together. Hence it seems unlikely that the
general fall in earnings could be attributed
to a work disincentive effect during the
1990s. If anything, the disincentive would
have been declining. Other factors related to
the rise in family earnings inequality are like-
ly behind the decline in earnings. The dif-
ference between the 1980s and 1990s for
these families is that rising transfer payments
offset earnings losses in the 1980s but not in
the 1990s. Hence both the proportion of peo-
ple in low income and the depth of low
income increased in the mid- and late 1990s.
This story does not hold for seniors, since for
this group low-income conditions have more
to do with pensions and transfers than
employment earnings. Low income among
seniors remained relatively low (by interna-
tional standards) in Canada during the 1990s.
NOTES
1 Adult-equivalent adjustment is a method for
adjusting family income to account for family
size and the economies of scale associated with
larger families. The data in Table 1 are adult-
equivalent adjusted and those in Chart 1 are not.
If family size is changing over time, it is desir-
able to adult-equivalent adjust the results.
Regarding data sources, in Table 1 the data come
only from the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF), which was discontinued after data year
1998. In Chart 1, data up to 1995 are from the
SCF, while those from 1996 to 1998 are from the
Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics.
2 A consistent series for wages up to 2000 is not
yet available. For the indices in Charts 2, 3 and
6 we use SCF data up to 1997, then estimate
expected growth in the wage series from 1997 to
2000 using Labour Force Survey (LFS) data.
3 This is a relative low-income measure, since the
cut-off is set relative to the median family income
in any given country. Hence, poorer countries
will have lower LICOs than richer ones. The
notion here is that low income among countries
is a relative concept. What constitutes dire finan-
cial straits depends upon the norms of the com-
munity (in this case country) in which one is
living (see Smeeding, O’Higgins and Rainwater
1990 for a discussion). Family income typically
is adult-equivalent adjusted to account for dif-
ferences in family size and the economies of scale
that are associated with larger families.
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